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Studies on bank proﬁtability vis-à-vis market power and efﬁciency span a number
of years, many countries, regions and methods. Yet, the experiences of the
Paciﬁc’s small states – where foreign banks are widespread and bank proﬁts
relatively high – remain unknown, leaving policy-makers ill-informed regarding
relevant policy development. This study ﬁlls a huge gap in literature by providing
some evidence on the issue in a Paciﬁc Island context. Two market power
hypotheses – the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the relative market
power (RMP) hypotheses together with two measures of the efﬁcient structure
(ES) hypothesis – X and scale efﬁciencies are estimated. The nonparametric data
envelopment analysis (DEA) technique is used to estimate efﬁciency scores for
banks in Fiji over the period 2000 to 2010 and the dynamic GMM to estimate the
relationships between market power and efﬁciency vis-à-vis proﬁtability. Results
show that the RMP and ES hypotheses might hold, but not the SCP. Proﬁts appear
to persist over time. Policy implications are considerable including that any
suggestions to limit further mergers and acquisitions of banks in the region may
have to be properly debated.
Keywords: Paciﬁc Island countries; Fiji; bank proﬁtability; market power;
efﬁciency; proﬁt persistence; DEA; GMM
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I. Introduction
Located North to —north-east of Australia, the Paciﬁc
Island countries (PICs) include Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa and Kiribati.
These ‘countries with special needs’ or small island devel-
oping states are economies with small markets, fragile
natural environments and limited opportunities for the
private sector. Some are constantly challenged by extreme
poverty, structural economic weaknesses, lack of capacity
to grow and acute susceptibility to external shocks. The
World Bank classiﬁes PICs as ‘lower middle income’ to
‘low income’ countries.
It is against this background that ﬁndings, such as
the IMF’s that bank proﬁts in these countries are
relatively high, are concerning (PFTAC, 2011). High
bank proﬁts may be market power or efﬁciency-driven.
If it is the case that proﬁts are market power-driven,
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then households and ﬁrms are likely to experience
high cost of borrowing, credit rationing and compro-
mised banking services, among others (Chortareas
et al., 2011). More importantly, these experiences are
likely to have adverse consequences for, or even
retard, economic growth and development (Beck
et al., 2007), thus aggravating the socio-economic
conditions of the region – especially since the
ﬁnance-led growth and poverty reduction policies and
aspirations in these economies are predominantly
bank-dominated; capital markets are either very small
and inactive or virtually nonexistent. However, high
proﬁtability may also be due to greater efﬁciency such
that the implications of market power effects on proﬁts
may be discarded.
While studies on bank proﬁtability vis-à-vis market
power and efﬁciency span a number of years, many coun-
tries, regions and methods, the experiences of the PICs
remain unknown. Banking history in the region dates back
to at least the 1870s, prominently feature foreign banks
and the quality of regulatory practices are equivalent to the
developed world’s, yet policy-makers remain ill-informed
with respect to the costs and beneﬁts of further mergers
and takeovers (M&As). Unfortunately, due to differences
in the regulatory and economic environments, ﬁndings of
other countries and/or regions may not be applicable to the
PICs.
This study thus ﬁlls a huge gap in the bank proﬁtability
vis-à-vis market power and efﬁciency literature. It is also
the ﬁrst to examine persistence of bank proﬁts in a Paciﬁc
Island context. We examine two market power hypoth-
eses: the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the
relative market power (RMP) hypotheses together with
two measures of the efﬁcient-structure (ES) hypothesis –
X and scale efﬁciencies. Due to data reliability and avail-
ability constraints, the study focuses on Fiji. However,
given the high level of structural and performance com-
parability across the region (PFTAC, 2011), ﬁndings are
likely to apply to other PICs.
Results show that the RMP and ES hypotheses might
hold, but not the SCP.Moreover, bank capital and liquidity
are negatively correlated with proﬁt levels and credit risk
is positively correlated. Proﬁts also appear to persist over
time. Policy implications are considerable including the
fact that any suggestions to limit further mergers and
acquisitions in Fiji, and possibly elsewhere in the region,
may have to be properly debated. These insights make
policy-makers better informed on the issue of bank proﬁt-
ability vis-à-vis market power and efﬁciency.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II
discuses the IMF ﬁndings; Section III brieﬂy reviews
trends in the structure and proﬁtability of banks in Fiji;
Section IV reviews the relevant literature; Section V dis-
cusses data and methodology; Section VI discusses the X
and scale efﬁciency results; Section VII discusses the
empirical results and Section VIII concludes with some
policy implications.
II. IMF Findings on Profitability of Banks in
the Pacific
Prepared at the request of the Central Bank Governors, the
IMF report covers six PICs: Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga,
Samoa, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. Table 1 provides
a summary of main proﬁtability ﬁndings; panel A shows
average pre-tax return on assets (ROA) and panel B shows
the highest recorded individual ROA. As per Table 1,
over the period 2006 to 2009, ratios for PICs were con-
sistently the highest. For example, in 2006, the PIC ratio of
5.2% was 1.7 times more than the next highest in the
sample, that of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Compared to Australia, the home country of the largest
banks in the region, the PIC ratio was around 3.5 times
more. In 2009, the average ROAs across countries and
regions appear to have declined compared to 2006 ratios;
however, the PIC ratio was still the highest – three times
more than Australia’s. Similarly, available data shows that
banks in the Paciﬁc had the highest individual ROA – as
high as 10.5% in 2008 and 9.3% in 2009 – far more than
the ratios of other regions – for example, only 3.5% and
1.6%, respectively, in emerging Europe.
Incidentally, bank proﬁts appear to remain high in the
region despite governments’ good intentions to liberalize
the banking systems over time, focussed mainly on
improved competition and efﬁciency. However, as the
IMF report further notes, banking sectors in the region
Table 1. Return on assets: PICs and others, 2006–2009
Panel A: Average ROAs (%)
2006 2007 2008 2009
PICs 5.2 4.9 4.0 2.8
Australia 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.9
New Zealand 1.7 1.6 1.3 …
Latin America 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 2.5 3.3 …
Mid East & Central Asia 2.2 2.1 1.4 …
Emerging Europe 1.6 1.7 1.3 0.3
Panel B: Individual High ROAs (%)
PICs 7.7 8.6 10.5 9.3
Latin America 3.5 3.1 3.5 5.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.8 3.9 4.2 …
Mid East & Central Asia 4 3.4 3.2 …
Emerging Europe 3.4 3.9 3.5 1.6
Note:… indicates data not available.
Source: IMF Report on Interest rates and bank proﬁtability in the
Paciﬁc; PFTAC, (2011).
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continue to be limited to three to four banks, raising the
question: does market power indeed inﬂuence high bank
proﬁts in the PICs?We investigate this issue later, but ﬁrst,
some background on Fiji’s ﬁnancial sector.
III. Fiji’s Banking Sector: Structure and
Profitability, 2000–2010
Structure
As is common in the region, Fiji’s banking sector is
more or less the ﬁnancial sector. Banks are subject to
international, BIS-based, regulatory standards and are
relatively advanced technologically – services available
to customers include telephone and internet banking.
With the ﬁrst bank established in 1873, Fiji has a long
banking history as well. Fiji has always been attractive
to well-established foreign banks and while foreign
interest prevails, the sector has consistently been limited
to four to ﬁve banks in its 140 year history.
Acquisitions have been common, mainly by two of the
oldest (Table 2). As Table 2 shows, Fiji’s pioneer bank was
acquired by the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) after only 3
years of operations. BNZ in turn was acquired by the
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) in
1990. While entry and exit is not state-controlled, acquisi-
tions have tended to keep the sector historically concen-
trated (Fig. 1). The Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
averaged around 3030 in the period 2000 to 2010, sug-
gesting high level of market concentration – generally, a
HHI of more than 2500 indicates high concentration. This
is conﬁrmed by the concentration index (CI) – the share of
the three largest banks relative to the total industry; over
the period 2000 to 2010, Fiji’s CI averaged 88%. By
comparison, in the same period, the average credit risk
(CR) was 60% in Australia, 90% in New Zealand and in
the case of some neighbouring and developing Asia-
Paciﬁc countries, 61% in the Philippines, 45% in
Thailand.
Profitability and risks
For proﬁtability, we focus on ROA since comparative
corresponding global data is available only for this mea-
sure, which is illustrated in Fig. 2, where, ‘FJ’ denotes Fiji
operations. As per Fig. 2, over the period 2000 to 2010,
there was a marked difference between the ROAs of Fiji
and global operations. Take the case of Westpac Banking
Corporation (WBC), for instance, the gap is signiﬁcant
and huge.
While highly proﬁtable, banks are not exposed to very
high levels of risks (PFTAC, 2011). Take, for instance,
2750
2800
2850
2900
2950
3000
3050
3100
3150
3200
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
HHI
HHI
Fig. 1. Concentration index (HHI) of Fiji’s banking indus-
try, 2000–2010
Table 2. A brief history of bank acquisitions in Fiji, 1873–2012
Currently operating First Entry
Country of
ownership/
incorporation Acquisitions Comment
Australia and New Zealand Bank
(ANZ)
1952 Australia Bank of New Zealand (BNZ)
(1876–1990)
BNZ entered the market by
taking over Fiji’s pioneer
bank, FBCT (1873–76)
Citibank (1970–78)
Barclays Bank International
(1972–85)
Bank of Hawaii (1993–2001)
Westpac Banking
Corporation (WBC)
1901 Australia HSBC (1986–88) Previously, Bank of NSW
Bank of Baroda 1961 India None
Bank South Paciﬁc 2009 Papua New
Guinea
Habib Bank Ltd
(HBL) (1991–2006)
Colonial National Bank (CNB)
HBL was a Pakistani bank.
CNB had entered the
market by acquiring 51%
shares in Fiji’s only local
bank, National Bank of
Fiji in 1999, and the rest
of the 49% in 2006.
Foreign banks, profits, market power and efficiency in PICs 1735
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capital risk, measured using the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) capital framework. As Fig. 3 shows,
the ratio has consistently been above the 8% minimum,
indicating that capital risk is low. Moreover, the ratios
have been rising in the period 2007 to 2010 – a period of
otherwise increasing worldwide economic and ﬁnancial
uncertainty.
Similarly, liquidity positions do not appear to be a
concern. As Fig. 4 shows, banks appear to have ample
liquid assets relative to total. Moreover, the credit risk
appears low as well (Fig. 5).Credit risk is measured by
the ratio of general reserves for credit losses to gross loans;
the generally low and downward trending patterns suggest
that banks are not expecting high levels of unexpected
loan losses in the future.
Overall, Fiji’s banking sector appears to be highly
concentrated, which could be a reason for high proﬁt-
ability; however, banks may have become more efﬁ-
cient over time, which may also contribute to high
proﬁts. The next section reviews the literature on the
possible proﬁtability vis-à-vis market power and efﬁ-
ciency associations, followed by an investigation of the
situation in Fiji.
IV. Literature Review
The SCP hypothesis of Bain (1951) essentially proposes
that markets characterized by a few ﬁrms will practice
pricing behaviours with the objective of maximizing prof-
its via collusion, price leadership or other tacit price
arrangements. In these markets, proﬁts are expected to
be greater than the competitive norm. A related theory is
the RMP, which asserts that supernormal proﬁts will be
earned only by ﬁrms with large market shares and well-
differentiated products (Shepherd, 1982). Studies show
that a causal relationship exists between market concen-
tration and performance of ﬁrms, supporting the collusion
hypothesis of the SCP paradigm (Goddard et al., 2001).
Evidence of collusion may be observed by higher interest
rates on loans, lower rates on deposits and higher fees and
charges.
However, proﬁtability may also be driven by greater
efﬁciency such that: (i) greater technical efﬁciencies or
better technologies may lead to higher proﬁts via lower
operating costs – the ESX (X efﬁciency) hypothesis; and/
or (ii) lower operating costs and thus higher proﬁtability
may be driven by more efﬁcient production levels – the
ESS (scale–efﬁciency) hypothesis. Greater efﬁciency may
also increase both proﬁt levels and market share, resulting
in spurious relationships, implying that market power and
efﬁciency tests should be conducted simultaneously to
ascertain the relative impact of each on proﬁtability
(Claeys and Vander, 2009). In the event that there is a
positive relationship between size and/or concentration
vis-à-vis proﬁtability, further M&As may be limited to
manage price-setting behaviours of banks. However,
M&As may not be limited if the ES hypotheses are pro-
ven, since higher proﬁtability would then also be a result
of efﬁciency gains.
The evidence on the relative impact of market power
and efﬁciency on proﬁtability appears inconclusive.
Moreover, while extensive, most studies have tended to
focus on developed countries, particularly the United
0
1
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ANZ FJ
ANZ
BOBFJ
BOB
WBC FJ
WBC
Fig. 2. Return on Assets (ROA, %) of Fiji operations of
selected banks compared to corresponding overseas banking
group, 2000–2010
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Fig. 3. Capital adequacy ratios of banks in Fiji
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Fig. 4. Liquidity risk of banks, 2000–2010
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Fig. 5. Credit risk of banks, 2000–2010
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States and more recently, the European Union; the PICs
have been largely ignored.With respect to market power, a
review of literature by Gilbert (1984) shows that over half
of the banking studies supported the SCP hypothesis.
More recent studies supporting the SCP hypothesis
include Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) in the
case of Spanish banks; Molyneux and Forbes (1995) in
the case of European banks and Berger and Hannan,
(1997) in the case of US banks. However, efﬁciency may
also contribute to higher proﬁts. For example, in the case
of European banks, Goldberg and Rai (1996) ﬁnd support
for the ESX hypothesis in countries with low concentra-
tion ratios with the impact of RMP evident otherwise.
Similarly, in the case of Spanish banks, Maudos (1998)
ﬁnds support for both ESX and RMP. In the case of US
banks as well, both ESX and RMP may contribute to
higher proﬁts (Berger, 1995). In the case of Chinese
banks, Fu and Heffernan (2009) ﬁnd support for RMP,
particularly in the pre-banking reform period (i.e. pre-
1992), but ESX becomes more prominent in explaining
bank proﬁts thereafter; however, the authors do not ﬁnd
any support for the SCP hypothesis. In the case of Latin
American countries, Chortareas et al. (2011) ﬁnd support
for the ES hypothesis, disregarding claims of any collu-
sion in the region’s banking sectors. In the case of Mexico,
Garza-Garcia (2012) ﬁnds that bank proﬁts are not deter-
mined by either technical or scale efﬁciencies; they are
determined by market power. In the case of the PICs, the
relationships are not known.
Persistence of profit
Abnormal proﬁts are likely to be competed away in a
market with free entry and exit conditions, such as in the
PICs, so that proﬁts might converge towards their long-
run equilibrium (Mueller, 1986, 1977). The static models
commonly used in the literature to test the competition vis-
à-vis bank performance relationships are useful in identi-
fying the casual links between market power and proﬁt
variables. However, contrary to a basic assumption of
these models, there is no certainty that markets are in
equilibrium in the long run. To manage this bias, dynamic
models are now applied to test the market power–proﬁt-
ability relationships (e.g. Athanassoglou et al., 2005;
Goddard et al., 2011). A dynamic model appears to be
particularly useful in testing the inﬂuence of entry and exit
conditions on proﬁts. Long-run equilibrium is more likely
and at a rapid pace in settings with sufﬁciently free entry
and exit conditions; slower adjustments to such equili-
brium and thus abnormal proﬁts are more likely where
rigid structural features persist (Goddard et al., 2011).
Empirical evidence on proﬁt persistence in banking
appears to be limited and results appear to be inﬂu-
enced by structure. A study on the US banking sector
ﬁnds proﬁt persistence to be temporary, not permanent
(Levonian, 1993). Further, proﬁt persistence may
depend on the performance distribution of a bank and
may strongly be related to impediments to competition,
regulatory policies and macroeconomic variables
(Berger et al., 2000). In the case of European coun-
tries, Goddard et al. (2004) ﬁnd proﬁt persistence to be
greater for mutual banks compared to commercial
banks. The authors also ﬁnd that strong regulatory
practices may contribute to greater proﬁt persistence.
In the case of Italian banks, proﬁt persistence is
observed in concentrated markets with high proﬁt
ownership (Agosttino et al., 2005). In the case of
Turkish banks, Bektas (2007) ﬁnds no evidence of
proﬁt persistence. In the case of Greece, proﬁts might
persist but only moderately and might converge to
long-run equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no existing study on proﬁt persistence in the
case of the PICs.
V. Data and Methodology
Data
The data for this study is mainly from the Reserve Bank of
Fiji’s online database and so is highly reliable. At the time
of investigation, available relevant data was only for the
period 2000 to 2010, i.e. 11 years. With ﬁve banks in Fiji,
the data set might appear limited. However, it is sufﬁcient
to investigate efﬁciency of banks using the data envelop-
ment analysis (DEA) technique since DEA works well
with small sample sizes. In a recent study, Moffat and
Valadkhani (2011) use the technique to investigate the
efﬁciency of 10 institutions over a 6 year period. The
data set was also sufﬁcient to run a regression analysis
using the dynamic generalized method of moments
(GMM) technique, which we use in this study as well. In
a recent study, Gounder and Sharma (2012) investigate the
determinants of net interest margin for banks in Fiji using
the same sample size as the one used in this study. Small
sample sizes have also been used in other studies, includ-
ing Bergendahl and Lindblom (2008) in investigating the
efﬁciency of independent savings banks (ISBs) in
Sweden, Havrylchyk (2006) in examining the efﬁciency
of the Polish banking system; Pasiouras (2007) in estimat-
ing the technical and scale efﬁciency of Greek banks and
Ataullah et al. (2004) in comparing bank efﬁciencies
between India and Pakistan.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
We propose to do two things: (i) compute the two efﬁ-
ciency estimators – ESX (X efﬁciency) and ESS (scale
efﬁciency); and (ii) subsequently, test the inﬂuence of both
ESX and ESS, together with market power and other
Foreign banks, profits, market power and efficiency in PICs 1737
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control variables on bank proﬁtability in Fiji. To compute
the efﬁciency estimators, we employ the nonparametric
DEA technique. As noted above, an important advantage
and a main reason for using DEA is that it works well with
small samples such as ours. Also, unlike parametric
approaches such as the stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA), DEA does not posit a particular functional form
for the best practice banks’ frontier. However, DEA does
not also take any random error into account; if random
errors exist, measured efﬁciency by nonparametric
approaches may be confounded by these random devia-
tions from the true frontier (Mester, 1996).
Introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), under the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale (CRS) in production, the
DEA essentially measures the ratio of outputs relative to
speciﬁed number of inputs. Assuming that there is data on
N inputs andM outputs for a group of ﬁrms I, and letting xi
and yi represent column vectors of inputs and outputs in
the ith ﬁrm, then the input and output matrices for the
group can be represented as N × I andM × I, respectively.
A ﬁrm’s decision to maximize output (output-oriented
model) can be represented mathematically as Max u, v(u′
yi/v’xi). When v′xi = 1, the formula is transformed to:
Max u;vðu0yiÞ;
it is subject to the constraints:
v0xi ¼ 1;
uyj  vxjd  0; j ¼ 1; 2::::::I ;
u; v  0;
(1)
where u is an M ×1 vector of output weights and v is an
N × 1 vector of input weights. Due to the duality in
linear programming, Equation 1 may be converted into
the following input-oriented linear programming func-
tion for calculating DEA efﬁciency under the assump-
tion of CRS,
Minλ; θ θ
subject to: yiþY λ  0;
θxi  X λ  0;
λ  0;
(2)
where λ is an I × 1 vector of constants. Here, θ is a scalar –
its value is the efﬁciency score for the ith ﬁrm. θ ≤ 1, with a
value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and, hence, a
technically efﬁcient ﬁrm (Coelli et al., 2005). To allow for
scale inefﬁciency, Banker et al. (1984) introduced a vari-
able returns to scale (VRS) model, which in turn allows
the computation of scale efﬁciency derived from CRS
technical efﬁciency (TE), that is, scale efﬁciency = TE
(CRS)/TE(VRS).
The DEA model, under the assumption of VRS, is
constructed by adding the constraint: ∏ ′λ = 1 to the
CRS model as follows:
Minλ; θ θ
subject to: yiþYλ  0;
θxi  Xλ  0;Y 0λ ¼ 1;
λ  0
(3)
where ∏ is an I × 1 vector of ones. Thus, the VRS
approach forms a convex hull of intersecting planes
that envelop the data more tightly than the CRS
approach.
Input/output speciﬁcations. In efﬁciency studies, it is
acknowledged that the choice of variables may inﬂuence
results. The input and output combination in the literature
has been speciﬁed variously depending on the approach.
For example, as per the ‘intermediation’ approach, inputs
usually include deposits, ﬁxed assets and employee num-
bers/expenses and the outputs include loans and other
interest-bearing investments. Similarly, as per the ‘produc-
tion’ approach, inputs include ﬁxed assets and employee
numbers/expenses and outputs include deposits, loans and
other interest-bearing investments. Thus, between these
two approaches, the main difference is the treatment of
deposits. To mitigate any signiﬁcant variations in the
results arising from the use of the two different
approaches, recent research has suggested using deposits
as an intermediary product (Holod and Lewis, 2011).
Similarly, as per the value-added approach, the inputs
include ﬁxed assets, employee numbers/expenses and
interest expense and the outputs include deposits, loans
and other interest-bearing investments.
We use deposits as inputs and thus the ‘intermediation’
approach, inﬂuenced by the Berger and Humphrey (1997)
argument that this approach may be ‘superior for evaluat-
ing the importance of frontier efﬁciency to the proﬁtability
of the ﬁnancial institution, since minimization of total
costs, not just production costs, is needed to maximize
proﬁts’ (p. 197). In a recent study, Sharma et al. (2012) use
the DEA technique to compute overall efﬁciencies of
banks and other deposit institutions in Fiji. We go a step
further to compute the two speciﬁc efﬁciency estimates –
ESX and ESS. Essentially, we rerun the DEA using the
same data set, but for banks only; moreover, Table 3
presents the descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs,
averaged for the period 2000 to 2010.
The DEA analysis produces two categories of scores: (i)
CRS ; and (ii) VRS , where the VRS scores represent ESX
estimates and CRS/VRS gives the estimates for scale
efﬁciency (ESS).When ESS = 1, a bank is efﬁcient under
1738 P. Sharma et al.
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both CRS and VRS, when ESS < 1, the bank is not scale-
efﬁcient.
Generalized method of moments
With the EES and ESX scores available, the next step is to
estimate their inﬂuence, together with that of market power
and other control variables, on bank proﬁts in Fiji. To do
that, we employ a dynamic model – the GMM and panel
data. GMM accounts for the dynamic process in bank
proﬁtability and is designed to handle autoregressive prop-
erties in the dependent variable when lagged values are
introduced as explanatory variables. In addition, GMM
allows the use of instrumental variables which produces
more precise and accurate estimators. Thus, exogenous
variables, the lagged dependent variable and the lagged
endogenous variables are utilized as instruments.
Instruments should be relevant and valid, i.e. correlated
with the endogenous regressors and orthogonal to the
errors. The over-identifying restrictions are tested via the
commonly employed J-statistic of Hansen (1982). If the
null hypothesis is rejected, the implication is that the instru-
ments do not satisfy the required orthogonality conditions.
Further, in the context of GMM, the moment conditions are
valid only if there is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic
errors. Accepting the null hypothesis at higher order, AR
(2), implies that the moment conditions are valid.
Accordingly, the regression estimates are based on the
following equation:
πit ¼ αit þ β1πi;t1 þ β2HHIt þ β3MSit þ β4LRit
þ β5CRit þ β6CAPit þ β7ESXit þ β8ESSit
þ β9INFt þ β10GDPt þ β11COUPt þ μi þ εit
(4)
where,
π is return on assets – net income/total assets or return
on equity – net income/total equity; two standard mea-
sures of proﬁtability;
α is the constant term;
πt-1 lagged ROA or ROE, two measures of proﬁt
persistence;
HHI Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index – deﬁned as the
sum of the squared market share value of each bank in
the banking sector, a measure of market concentration and
the SCP hypothesis;
MS is market size – total assets of one bank to total
assets of all banks, a measure of the RMP hypothesis
LR is liquidity risk – total liquid assets to total assets;
higher ratios indicate lower risk;
CR is credit risk – general reserves for credit losses to
gross loans; higher ratios indicate higher perceived risk;
CAP is capital risk – total capital to total risk adjusted
asset; measure of capital risk; higher ratios indicate lower
risk;
ESX is X or TE;
ESS is scale efﬁciency;
INF is the annual inﬂation rate;
GDP is the annual gross domestic product growth;
COUP is a dummy variable, equals value 1 in 2000 and
2007, 0 otherwise
µ is unobserved bank-speciﬁc time invariant effect; and
ε is a disturbance effect independent across banks.
In the equation, π is a measure of bank proﬁtability; we
use both ROA and ROE. πt-1 is the lagged ROA or ROE
and measures the persistence of proﬁts, i.e. the extent to
which a bank remains in the same proﬁt distribution. In the
absence of market power, abnormal proﬁts are likely to be
competed away very quickly. The coefﬁcient of the vari-
able, in this case β2, indicates the speed at which proﬁts
might adjust to long-run equilibrium (Athanassoglou
et al., 2005). Proﬁts are perceived to persist if the value
of the coefﬁcient lies between 0 and 1; a value closer to 0
indicates a high speed of adjustment and that the industry
is highly competitive, a value closer to 1 indicates a very
low speed, suggesting that the industry might be
uncompetitive.
HHI is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index, a measure
of the degree of market concentration (in terms of
assets); a positive relationship will indicate acceptance
of the SCP hypothesis. MS is the market share of each
bank in terms of assets and a positive sign would
suggest that the relative market share contributes to
proﬁtability such that the RMP hypothesis would be
accepted. CR is a measure of credit risk and a negative
sign is expected since nonperforming loans are costly
to banks. LR is a measure of liquidity risk and a
negative sign is expected since greater levels of liquid
assets imply lower levels of interest earning assets.
CAP is a measure of capital risk and a positive sign
is expected since greater capital levels might reduce
Table 3. Input/output descriptive statistics, average 2000–
2010 (in FJDm)
FA DEP EMP LON OEA
ANZ 27272 1045253 51995 893671 129419
BOB 3175 265739 6080 99662 152647
WBV 14478 713154 23474 625473 31841
CNB 8837 416645 24582 346177 38918
BSP 386 36407 1517 25962 10049
Mean 10829 495439 21529 398189 72575
SD 10669 393502 19878 363159 63922
Min 386 36407 1517 25962 10049
Max 27272 1045253 51995 893671 152647
Note: ANZ = Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation
Ltd; BOB = Bank of Baroda; BSP = Bank of South Paciﬁc
Limited; CNB = Colonial National Bank Limited; and
WBC = Westpac Banking Corporation Limited. FA = ﬁxed
assets; DEP = deposits; EMP = employee expenses, a proxy for
number of employees; LON = loans; and OEA = other earning
assets.
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funding costs of borrowing, among others. ESX and
ESS are measures of X and scale efﬁciencies, respec-
tively; a positive relationship with ROA would support
the ES hypothesis, indicating that proﬁts are inﬂuenced
by improved efﬁciencies. Turning to the macroeco-
nomic variables, INF is the annual inﬂation rate and
the expected sign is negative. GDP is a measure of
growth and the expected sign is positive. COUP is a
dummy variable, measuring the consequences of the
two coup d’états the country has experienced in the
sampling period and the expected sign is negative. The
two coups (2000 and 2007) negatively impacted GDP
in these years; it would be interesting to see how they
may have affected bank proﬁts.
VI. X and Scale Efficiency Results
Overall, the industry appears to have done better with
respect to X compared to scale efﬁciency, i.e. TE scores
are higher than production scores; over the period 2000 to
2010, the industry average for X was 85.4% and for scale
was 71.9% (Table 4). For X, the lowest was 76.1% (2001)
and the highest was 95.2% (2006); for scale, lowest was
66.3% (2007) and highest was 78.3% (2000). The differ-
ence between technical and scale efﬁciency scores appears
to be more obvious among the larger banks. For example,
the largest bank, ANZ, had an average TE score up to
88.6% but an average scale efﬁciency score of only 50.2%
over the sampling period. Comparatively, the smallest
bank, Bank SP, had a score of 84.8% for TE and 88.7%
for scale efﬁciency.
Our results are consistent with those of several efﬁ-
ciency studies on Australian banks, which are parent
banks of three of the ﬁve banks in Fiji (e.g. Sturm and
Williams, 2004; Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006; Shamsuddin
and Xiang, 2012). On one hand, a large bank may take
advantage of technology that is more advanced and super-
ior managements as well as the beneﬁts of economies of
scale and/or scope. On the other hand, the large bank may
also take advantage of the premiums of being too-big-to-
fail. In addition, the market power of the large bank may
incur inefﬁciencies because of the shelter hypothesis
(Leibenstein, 1966). In the case of banks in Australia,
Sturm and Williams (2004) ﬁnd that scale inefﬁciency
dominated technical inefﬁciency over the period 1988 to
2001, especially for the big four.1 The authors interpret
this as a strategy used by the big four to discourage entry
of foreign banks following deregulation. The X and scale
Table 4. X and scale efﬁciency scores of banks in Fiji, 2000–2010
Panel A: X efﬁciency
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean
ANZ 88.27 85.18 84.26 83.30 83.37 77.61 91.25 90.25 95.11 95.59 100.00 88.56
BOB 91.14 91.18 100.00 93.69 98.98 94.30 100.00 100.00 93.74 95.38 100.00 96.22
WBC 67.73 64.84 71.72 71.19 80.31 86.57 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.28 88.24 84.53
CNB 58.07 44.74 59.86 61.65 65.25 71.54 84.82 87.84 100.00 95.65 71.89 72.85
BSP 100.00 94.65 100.00 93.94 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.24 65.09 55.33 58.54 84.89
Mean 81.04 76.12 83.17 80.75 85.58 86.00 95.22 88.87 90.79 88.25 83.73 85.41
Panel B: Scale efﬁciency
ANZ 48.06 48.25 47.89 47.21 46.02 56.33 53.81 50.32 45.92 53.93 54.42 50.20
BOB 84.78 84.84 84.07 83.22 83.30 83.10 82.76 82.24 80.41 81.10 91.56 83.76
WBC 70.02 75.83 71.77 84.44 88.30 81.73 89.97 84.03 77.29 73.17 63.90 78.22
CNB 88.47 77.55 76.63 58.78 55.90 56.78 56.61 52.10 42.94 45.56 36.19 58.87
BSP 100.00 70.86 100.00 74.86 81.05 100.00 100.00 62.73 99.20 89.22 97.40 88.67
Mean 78.27 71.47 76.07 69.70 70.92 75.59 76.63 66.29 69.15 68.60 68.69 71.94
1 The big four includes: National Australia Bank Limited (NAB), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Limited (ANZ) and Westpac Banking Corporation Limited (WBC).
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Fig. 6. X efﬁciency of banks in Fiji, 2000–2010
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efﬁciencies of the ﬁve banks are illustrated in Figs. 6
and 7, respectively.
X efficiency
As Fig. 6 shows, in terms of TE, Bank of Baroda (BOB)
appears to be the overall best performing bank; its average
score over the period 2001 to 2010 was 96.2%, clearly the
highest. More importantly, BOB’s good performance
appears to be consistent for the entire sampling period.
Occasionally, BOB’s score reached 100% (four times,
including in 2010). Of the two larger banks, ANZ appears
to be second ranked in TE; its average over the period was
88.6%. On a further positive note, ANZ’s score, like
BOB’s, reached 100% in 2010. Beginning with 88.3% in
2000, ANZ’s TE appears to have been on a declining
trend, albeit marginally until 2004; it dipped noticeably
to 77.6% in 2005, but rebounded and has been over 90%
thereafter, peaking at 100% in 2010.
The other large bank, Westpac, does not appear to have
performed very well compared to others. Ranked fourth,
Westpac’s average was 84.5% over the period 2000 to
2010. Interestingly, however, Westpac reached 100%
three times (2006–2008), rising steadily from 67.7% in
2000, and peaking in 2006. Post-2008, the trend has been
declining and was 88.2% in 2010.Technically, at least,
Westpac would be expected to perform much better.
Scale efficiency
As noted above, the scale efﬁciency scores are generally
lower than the TE scores, especially for the larger banks.
Over the sampling period, the two large banks, ANZ and
WBC, appear to be operating under decreasing returns to
scale (DRS); the three smaller banks appear to be operating
under increasing returns to scale (IRS) or CRS. The best
performer regarding scale efﬁciency, was again BOB,
which showed stable and high scale efﬁciency (Fig. 7).
BOB’s average score over the period 2000 to 2010 was
83.8%, lower than its own X efﬁciency average score and
also ranked second this time. The leader of the pack with
respect to scale efﬁciency was Bank of South Paciﬁc
Limited (BSP), the smallest and newest bank in the country;
its average score was 88.7%. However, it may be noted that
BSP appears to have had a rather volatile experience,
including some noticeable dips, such as in 2007 to 61.7%
from 100% in the previous year. Overall, though, the smal-
ler banks (BOB and BSP) appear to be more production-
efﬁcient compared to the larger banks (ANZ and Westpac).
ANZ’s average was 50.2%, clearly the lowest across the
ﬁve banks; its highest was 54.4% (2010) and lowest
46.0% (2005); that is, ANZ’s production efﬁciency level
appears to be only around half of the optimum level. In
2010, ANZ appears to have been about 77% less efﬁcient
than BSP and 67% less than BOB.Westpac’s performance
was better than ANZ’s; its average score was 78.2%, but
still much lower than BSP’s or BOB’s. Moreover,Westpac
had not reached its full capacity in the period 2000 to
2010, its production efﬁciency appears to have peaked in
2006 (90%) and the trend has been steadily declining
thereafter, to rest at 63.9% in 2010.
Table 5. GMMestimates of market power and efﬁciency vis-
à-vis proﬁtability
Column Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
L.DEP 0.5304** 0.4590*** 0.6564** 0.5359***
(0.2019) (0.1400) (0.2342) (0.0646)
HHI 0.1254 0.1195 −3.0158 0.2585
(0.1728) (0.1455) (0.3369) (4.5942)
MS 0.0132 0.0166* 1.8332 1.8155***
(0.0102) (0.0082) (1.2790) (0.3994)
ESX 0.0175 0.0192** −0.4667** −0.2811
(0.0107) (0.0073) (0.2033) (0.2065)
SSE 0.0161* 0.0177** −0.2087 −0.2056
(0.0081) (0.0067) (0.2267) (0.2043)
CR 0.0137 0.0110 1.2382** 0.8929*
(0.0192) (0.0169) (0.5288) (0.4404)
CAP −0.0002** −0.0003** −0.0024 −0.0050**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0025) (0.0016)
LR −0.0136* −0.0136** −0.2481 −0.0442
(0.0071) (0.0056) (0.2830) (0.2963)
GDP 0.0007 0.0002 −0.0042 −0.0062**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0084) (0.0024)
INF −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0006 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.8320)
COUP −0.0051 −0.0703
(0.0031) (0.0538)
AR(1) −0.4863** −0.3722** −0.5574* −0.3561**
(0.2088) (0.1633) (0.2853) (0.1388)
AR(2) −0.2695 −0.0770 −0.2495 −0.0360
(0.2265) (0.1995) (0.2189) (0.0998)
Adjusted R2 0.5800 0.5700 0.7334 0.7420
SE of
regression
1.1100 1.1260 0.0726 0.0714
J-statistic 10.100 9.7400 4.7653 4.0600
[0.3400] [0.3716] [0.8542] [0.9074]
Notes: SEs are in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates;
p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Fig. 7. Scale efﬁciency of banks in Fiji, 2000–2010
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VII. GMM Results
The results of the GMM regression analysis are provided
in Table 5. In Models 1 and 2, ROA is the dependent
variable, in Models 3 and 4, ROE is the dependent vari-
able. The Hansen test shows no evidence of over-identify-
ing restrictions as the p-value of J-statistics is not
signiﬁcant in any of the models. The diagnostics also
indicate that a negative ﬁrst-order autocorrelation AR(1)
is present. However, second-order autocorrelation is
rejected, as indicated by the nonsigniﬁcant p-values for
AR(2) errors, implying that the estimates are consistent.
As Table 5 shows, the lagged dependent variable is
positive and signiﬁcant in all models, indicating that prof-
its are likely to persist over time. However, as the coefﬁ-
cients lie between 0.45 and 0.65, the indication is that the
market may not be as highly uncompetitive as generally
perceived. Moreover, the HHI shows no signiﬁcance in
any of the models, thus the SCP hypothesis may be
rejected, i.e. the structure of the sector may not signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence proﬁtability of banks in Fiji. On the other
hand, MS is positive and signiﬁcant in two cases when
COUP is controlled for, indicating that the RMP hypoth-
esis may be accepted. Thus, it appears that banks with
greater market share may be able to obtain higher proﬁts.
Higher proﬁts also appear to be inﬂuenced by efﬁciencies.
However, the inﬂuence appears to be affected by the
measure of proﬁtability used.
SSE has a positive and signiﬁcant effect in ROA mod-
els, but the effect is not signiﬁcant in ROE models.
Interestingly, ESX has a positive and signiﬁcant effect in
the ROA model where COUP is controlled for but has a
negative and signiﬁcant effect in the ROEmodel where no
control is for COUP. The discrepancy in the results of the
two models may lie in the gearing issue, since ROE is
signiﬁcantly affected by ﬁnancial leverage. Given the fact
that banks are highly levered, this discrepancy may imply
that ROA is a more appropriate measure of proﬁtability.
Since both ESX and SSE are signiﬁcant in two cases, the
ES hypothesis might be accepted.
With respect to the remaining bank-speciﬁc variables,
CR is positive and signiﬁcant in two cases, indicating
that banks with more risky assets may be more proﬁt-
able. It can also imply that perceptions about higher
losses from credit are likely to encourage management
to be more mindful of proﬁt levels, resulting in proﬁts
actually increasing during these times. CAP is negative
and signiﬁcant in all four models, indicating that more
capital may not necessarily lead to higher proﬁt levels.
LR is also negative and signiﬁcant in two cases, indicat-
ing that higher levels of liquid assets are likely to result
in lower proﬁt levels. These results are similar to pre-
vious studies on Fiji (Gounder and Sharma, 2012). The
macroeconomic factors do not show any signiﬁcance
whatsoever, indicating that the proﬁtability of banks in
Fiji may not be affected by the macroeconomic
environment.
VIII. Conclusion and Some Policy Implications
The IMF ﬁnding that bank proﬁts in the PICs are rela-
tively high is concerning, especially in light of the
adverse socio-economic circumstances of these econo-
mies. Essentially, these are small island developing
states; some are even categorized as less developed
economies. The foregoing raises the question of whether
the high proﬁts might be market power-driven. If they
are, possible consequences might be high loan rates,
credit rationing, compromised banking services, among
others, which, based on the ﬁnance-growth literature,
may in turn lead to retarded, not enhanced economic
growth and increased, not reduced poverty and inequal-
ity. However, proﬁts may also be efﬁciency-driven such
that implications of market power effects on proﬁts may
be discarded. Accordingly, an appropriate understanding
of the simultaneous effects of market power and efﬁ-
ciency on proﬁts, in a Paciﬁc Island context, appears
imperative for policy development.
Two market power hypotheses – the SCP and the RMP
hypotheses – together with two measures of the ES – X
and scale efﬁciencies – are estimated. The study uses the
nonparametric DEA technique to estimate the efﬁciency
scores for banks in Fiji over the period 2000 to 2010 and
the dynamic GMM to estimate the relationships between
market power and efﬁciency vis-à-vis proﬁtability.
Results show that bank proﬁtability might be inﬂuenced
by relative market share (RMP theory) and efﬁciencies
(ES hypothesis), but not market structure (SCP theory).
Proﬁts also seem to persist over time. although the coefﬁ-
cients indicate that the industry may not be as uncompe-
titive as might appear. Thus, the RMP and ES hypotheses
appear to hold in the case of banks in Fiji. Other inﬂuential
bank-speciﬁc variables include capital and liquid assets –
both negatively associated, and credit risk – positively
associated. That is, higher levels of capital and liquid
assets tend to reduce proﬁts and higher perceived credit
risk tends to increase proﬁts. The macroeconomic vari-
ables, on the other hand, appear to have little effect on
proﬁts.
From a policy perspective then, it appears that any
suggestions of limiting further mergers and acquisitions
to discourage further market concentration may need to
properly debated. While the RMP hypothesis appears to
hold, the SCP hypothesis does not. That is, market
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concentration does not appear to inﬂuence bank proﬁt-
ability. With respect to the RMP hypothesis, while market
share appears to inﬂuence proﬁts, it may not necessarily be
the case that banks with greater market share are indeed
pricing their products above competitive levels. Both
ROA and ROE measures of proﬁtability focus on net
income, which is comprised of interest as well as non-
interest income components. Interest income of banks in
Fiji has usually been closely monitored by the Reserve
Bank of Fiji, including regulations on interest spreads
since 2010.Moreover, pricing information is well adver-
tised. Thus, pricing above competitive levels may not
seem to be an effective strategy for banks in Fiji.
Accordingly, any suggestion that market power, either in
the form of structure or market share, might be a major
source of high bank proﬁtability in Fiji may not be valid.
Similarly, any suggestion that market power might be a
cause of any high cost of borrowing, credit rationing and/
or compromised banking services might also not be valid.
If ﬁnance matters for growth, poverty, etc. and if banks
can remain highly proﬁtable without having to enhance
their interest income levels via substantially expanded
loan portfolios, then signiﬁcant further ﬁnance-led macro-
economic beneﬁts may not appear too promising.
Moreover, the ﬁnding that proﬁts may have partly been
due to improved efﬁciencies – the ES hypothesis appears
to hold – makes it challenging to require banks to become
substantially more efﬁcient.
In view of the foregoing, encouraging banks to supply
more credit in the hope of fostering growth and reducing
poverty via ﬁnance might have to be accomplished via
strategies other than limiting market concentration and/or
substantially improved efﬁciencies, especially in light of
emerging new regulations relating to interest spreads,
mandatory lending, etc. In addition to maintaining a 4%
interest spread, banks are required to lend a speciﬁed
proportion of their mobilized deposits to micro and small
enterprises (from 2010), and agriculture and renewable
energy sectors (from 2013), which the banks are happy
to comply with. Moreover, Fiji’s banking system remains
sound and stable; global ﬁnancial and economic crises
have not had much effect on stability and soundness.
There is no guarantee that a less concentrated market or
enhanced efﬁciency will foster Fiji’s economic growth via
increased demand and supply of credit. However, there is
a chance that a less concentrated market might have
adverse consequences for stability and soundness.
Given that the structure of banking and ﬁnancial
systems across the Paciﬁc Island states is greatly com-
parable, the results and policy implications of this study
are likely to apply to other regional economies as well.
Future research may investigate the importance of var-
ious interest and noninterest components of income for
bank proﬁtability in Fiji and across the region; it
appears that noninterest income might be an import
source. Research may also look at other options for
enhancing ﬁnance-led growth in the region and employ
techniques other than DEA to estimate banking efﬁ-
ciency, which might better explain the efﬁciency–prof-
itability relationship. In the meantime, the insights of
this study make policy-makers in Fiji, and possibly
elsewhere in the Paciﬁc, much better informed with
respect to the important issue of bank proﬁtability vis-
à-vis market power and efﬁciency.
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